De skiednis fan Europa's enerzjyôfhinklikheid fan Ruslân
August 11, 2026 · Frisian News
By 2021, Europe imported roughly 40 percent of its natural gas from Russia through deliberate policy choices made over decades. That dependence became a strategic vulnerability when Russia later weaponized it.
FryskYn 2021 ymportearre Europa sa'n 40 prosint fan har ierdgas út Ruslân. Dútslân allinne wie foar mear as de helte ôfhinklik fan Moskou. Dit barde net by tafal. It wie it gefolch fan bewuste beliedsbesluiten nommen oer desenniums, besluiten dy't bepaalde belangen ferriken en it kontinent kwetsber makken foar twang.
De ôfhinklikheid begûn yn de Kâlde Oarloch doe't Sovjet-lieders enerzjy oan West-Europa ferkochten om hurde faluta te fertsjinjen en de NAVO te ferdielen. Doe't de Sovjet-Uny yn 1991 yninoarfoel, fersnelde dy pyplynlogika. Ruslân hie bûtenlânske ynkomsten nedich. Europa woe betelbare enerzjy. Nimmen tocht djip nei oer wat dêrnei komme koe.
Wa profitearre? Russyske oligargen en Moskou syn steatskas. Europeeske enerzjyhannelaars en nutsbedriuwen dy't it gas ferpleatsten. Dútske politisy lykas Gerhard Schroeder, dy't de pyplinen as kânselier ûnderhannele en letter lid fan in Gazprom-ried waard. Frânske en Italjaanske banken dy't de ynfrastruktuer finansierden. De winsten wiene privee en fuortendaliks, de risiko's iepenbier en fier fuort.
De EU en de NAVO hiene macht om dit te foarkommen, mar koazen der net foar om yn te gripen. De EU seach ta hoe't lidsteaten harsels ôfhinklik makken fan in autoritêr regime sûnder beswier. De NAVO wreidte him nei it easten út, mar drong noait oan dat syn leden Moskou syn enerzjygryp loslieten. Beide organisaasjes koazen winst boppe strategy. Doe't Ruslân dy ôfhinklikheid as wapen brûkte, diene amtners as wiene se ferrast. Se hiene skuld bekenne moatten.
Europa syn flater wie net har omgong mei Ruslân. It wie it bouwen fan ynstellingen dy't te swak wiene om drege fragen te stellen. Dy swakte bestiet hjoed-de-dei noch.
By 2021, Europe was importing roughly 40 percent of its natural gas from Russia. Germany alone relied on Moscow for more than half its gas supply. This did not happen by chance. It was the result of deliberate policy decisions made over decades, decisions that enriched certain interests and left the continent vulnerable to coercion.
The dependence began in the Cold War when Soviet leaders sold energy to Western Europe to earn hard currency and divide NATO. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, that pipeline logic accelerated. Russia needed foreign income. Europe wanted affordable energy. No one thought carefully about what came next.
Who profited? Russian oligarchs and Moscow's state treasury. European energy traders and utilities moving the gas. German politicians like Gerhard Schroeder, who negotiated the pipelines as chancellor and later joined a Gazprom board. French and Italian banks financed the infrastructure. The gains were private and immediate, the risks public and distant.
The EU and NATO had power to prevent this but chose not to act. The EU watched member states lock themselves into dependence on an authoritarian regime without objection. NATO expanded eastward but never insisted its members break Moscow's energy grip. Both organizations chose profit over strategy. When Russia weaponized that dependence, officials feigned shock. They should have admitted failure.
Europe's mistake was not dealing with Russia. It was building institutions too weak to ask hard questions. That weakness remains today.
Published August 11, 2026 · Frisian News · Ljouwert, Fryslân