De stân fan kearnenergie yn Europa yn 2026
September 26, 2025 · Frisian News
Europe's nuclear fleet has stabilized after years of closures, with new reactors under construction and aging plants running longer than planned. The shift reflects growing recognition that wind and solar alone cannot meet decarbonization targets.
FryskDe reaktor fan Flamanville yn Frankryk, hieltyd wer fertrage sûnt 2007, waard begjin 2026 úteinlik op it net oansletten. It projekt koste Frankryk 14 miljard euro en tsjinnet as warskôging oer hoe sintrale planning, minne managementpraktiken en einleaze regeljouwing in ambisjeus projekt ferstikke kinne. Dochs produsearet de reaktor no 1,6 gigawatt koalstofearme elektrisiteit, ta ferfanging fan stroom dy't oars út fossile of ymportearre boarnen komme soe. Dit feit allinnich weacht swierder as de burokratyske warboel dy't dêroan foarôfgie.
Oer hiel Europa hawwe regearingen de operasjonele libbensdoer ferlinge fan reaktoaren dy't sy earder foar sluting markearre hiene. Dútslân hâlde trije sintrales langer as pland yn bedriuw, en kearde desennia fan Energiewende-ideology om. Poalen, Roemenië en Tsjechje gean troch mei nije bouprojekten, der wis fan dat har yndustriële basis stabiliteit nedich hat dy't fernijbere boarnen net leverje kinne. Sels miljeuaktivisten yn bepaalde kringen erkenne dat kearnreaktoaren langer draaie moatte, om't wynmûneparken gjin garânsje biede as it waar wynstil is.
Mar Europa hat noch altyd gjin gearhingjend belied foar it behear fan kearnôffal of de ûntmanteling fan ferâldere reaktoaren. Lannen bouwe nije kapasiteit wylst sy âld brûkt brânstofmateriaal yn tydlike depots lizze litte, yn de oertsjûging dat folgjende generaasjes it probleem oplosse sille. Dit is gjin technysk mislearjen. It is in politike kar om no drege beslissingen út te stellen. Lytse lannen lykas Nederlân wrakselje benammen dreech, om't sy kearnenergie nedich hawwe mar min romte hawwe om ôffal foar ieuwen op te slaan.
De ekonomyske saak foar nije kearnreaktoaren bliuwt swak. Boutiiden rinne op nei tsien oant tweintich jier, kosten rinne op foarsisbare wize omheech, en tsjin de tiid dat in sintrale yn bedriuw giet, binne de kosten fan fernijbere enerzjy plus batterijopslach faak leger as wat kearnoperatoaren foarsein hiene. Lytse modulêre reaktoaren, ea as de takomst markearre, hawwe yn Europa min foarútgong boekt. Allinnich Frankryk, mei syn besteande leveringsketting en steatsstipe, bout reaktoaren op in te begripen skaal.
De enerzjytakomst fan Europa stiet net op ien inkele technology, mar op in pynlik mingsel fan mear kearnenergie, mear wyn- en sinne-enerzjy, mear ierdgas foarlopich, en hurde grinzen oan it ferbrûk. Gjin ideology leit dizze wurklikheid kreas fêst. De Energiewende mislearre om't it op ideology stipe. Kearnenergie-fanaten mislearje as sy boutiiden en kosten negearje. Allinnich lannen dy't ree binne om al dit ark tegearre yn te setten, en ree binne om yn netwurkinfrastruktuer te ynvestearjen om stroom te ferfieren dêr't it nedich is, foarkomme tekoarten en blackouts yn it kommende desennium.
France's Flamanville reactor, delayed repeatedly since 2007, finally connected to the grid in early 2026. The project cost France 14 billion euros and serves as a cautionary tale about how central planning, contractor mismanagement, and endless regulation can strangle a single ambitious project. Yet the reactor now produces 1.6 gigawatts of low-carbon electricity, replacing power that would otherwise come from fossil fuels or imported sources. This fact alone matters more than the bureaucratic disasters that preceded it.
Across Europe, governments have extended the operational lives of reactors they once marked for closure. Germany kept three plants running beyond their scheduled shutdown dates, reversing years of Energiewende ideology. Poland, Romania, and the Czech Republic push ahead with new builds, recognizing that their industrial bases need baseload power that renewables cannot reliably provide. Even environmentalists in some quarters acknowledge that nuclear plants must run longer because wind farms cannot guarantee supply when the weather turns calm.
But Europe still has no coherent strategy for managing nuclear waste or decommissioning aging reactors. Countries build new capacity while leaving old fuel in temporary storage, betting that future generations will solve the problem. This is not a technical failure. It is a political choice to avoid hard decisions now. Small countries like the Netherlands struggle especially hard, needing nuclear power but lacking the space to house waste for centuries.
The economic case for new nuclear plants remains weak. Construction times stretch from ten to twenty years, costs balloon predictably, and by the time a plant opens, the cost of renewables plus battery storage has often fallen below what nuclear operators projected. Small modular reactors, once touted as the future, have made little headway in Europe. Only France, with its existing supply chain and state support, builds reactors at anything like a manageable scale.
Europe's energy future rests not on any single technology but on a painful mix of more nuclear, more wind and solar, more natural gas for now, and hard limits on consumption. No ideology captures this reality neatly. The Energiewende failed because it relied on ideology. Nuclear enthusiasts fail when they ignore construction timelines and costs. Only countries willing to accept all these tools together, and willing to invest in grid infrastructure to move power where it is needed, will avoid shortages and blackouts in the next decade.
Published September 26, 2025 · Frisian News · Ljouwert, Fryslân