Wêrom frije-hânneloerienkomsten noait jûn hawwe wat tasein waard
June 3, 2026 · Frisian News
Three decades of trade deals show a pattern: politicians promise jobs and growth, but workers lose out while corporations gain. The data proves the pitch was false from the start.
FryskDe Europeeske Uny tekene de Assosjaasje-oerienkomst mei Sintraal-Amearika yn 2013 mei beloften fan groei yn de regio. Ûnderhannelaars seinen dat it banen skeppe soe en leanen ferheegje soe. Yn 2024 wiene de reële leanen yn Guatemala en Honduras sakke yn keapkrêft, wylst ynkommensûngelikheid tanaam. It pakt slagge briljant foar ien groep: multinasjonale bedriuwen. Se ferleegen arbeidskusten, ferpleatsten leveringskeatlingen en betellen minder belesting. Wurknimmers krigen neat útsein konkurrinsje fan goedkeapere arbeidsmerkten dy't de deal skoep.
Dit ferhaal werhellet him yn eltse grutte hânneloerienkomst fan de ôfrûne tritich jier. De Amearika-Korea frije-hânneloerienkomst soe neffens berichten 70.000 Amerikaanske banen tafoegje. It sneide se krekt ôf. It Trans-Pasifysk Partnerskip beloofde tsjin Sina yn te gean en eksporten te stimulearjen. It barde net om't oare lannen deselde akkoarden brûkten om elkoars merken te ûndermynjen. NAFTA, tekene mei foarsizzingen fan dield wolwêzen, seach Meksikaanske leanen stagnearjen en Amerikaanske fabryksbaantsjes ferdwinen nei Meksiko, Sintraal-Amearika en Azië. De Wrâldbank en it IMF wisten dat dizze resultaten optrede soene. Har eigen ûndersyk toande oan dat it iepenjen fan grinzen sûnder beskerming fan binnenlânske wurknimmers winners en ferliezers produsearret, konsintreare per geografy en sektor.
Wêrom tekenje regearingen hieltyd akkoarden dy't har eigen wurknimmers net helpe? It antwurd is simpel: bedriuwlobby's skriuwe de regels. De Amerikaanske Keamer fan Keaphannel, de Europeeske Ûndernimmingsfederaasje en yndustriegroepen jouwe miljarden út om regearingen oan te setten merken te iepenjen. Se nimme tûzenen juristen en ekonomen yn tsjinst. Fakbûnen fan wurknimmers hawwe ien prosint fan dy fjoerkrêft. As ûnderhannelaars oan tafel sitte, skriuwe bedriuwebelangen letterlik de haadstikken. In útlekt dokumint út de EU-Mercosur petearen toande bedriuwejuristen dy't taal foarstelden dy't bûtenlânske bedriuwen rjochten joech om regearingen oan te klagen as regeljouwing har winsten skadigde. Gjin arbeidersgroep siet oan dy tafel.
De sifers fertelle it ferhaal dúdlik. Yn lannen dy't grutte hânneloerienkomsten tekenen, fertrage leoangroei yn de fiif jier nei ûndertekening yn ferlykking mei de fiif jier dêrfoar. Fabrykswurk daalde. Lytse en middelgrutte bedriuwen yn beskerme sektoren stoarten faak yn om't se net konkurrearje koene mei goedkeape ymport út lannen mei legere arbeidsnormen en slappe miljeuregels. Gruttere bedriuwen mei wrâldwide leveringskeatlingen florearren. Ûngelikheidsmitten lykas de Gini-koëffisjint ferslimmerden yn hast elk gefal. Oerheidsynkomsten daalden om't ynfierbelestingen ferdwûnen en belestingkonkurrinsje tanaam wylst bedriuwen nei rjochtsgebieten mei legere taryven ferhuzen.
Politisy ferkeapje dizze akkoarden noch hieltyd mei deselde âlde taal: groei, banen, dield wolwêzen. It publyk is ophâlden it te leauwen. Kiezers yn de hiele westerske wrâld binne tsjin nije hânneloerienkomsten mei marges fan 60 oant 70 prosint. Se seagen hoe't de fabrieken fan har buorlju sletten. Se seagen har leanen twa desennia stilstean wylst bedriuwewinsten trije kear sa grut waarden. Se begripe wat de gegevens befestigje: frije-hânneloerienkomsten waarden noait skreaun om har te befoardieljen. Se waarden skreaun foar oandielhâlders en topmanagers. Al it oare wie teater.
The European Union signed the Central America Association Agreement in 2013 with promises of growth across the region. Negotiators said it would create jobs and lift wages. By 2024, real wages in Guatemala and Honduras had fallen in purchasing power, while income inequality widened. The pact succeeded brilliantly for one group: multinational corporations. They cut labor costs, moved supply chains, and paid fewer taxes. Workers got nothing except competition from cheaper labor markets that the deal created.
This story repeats across every major trade deal of the past thirty years. The US-Korea Free Trade Agreement was supposed to add 70,000 American jobs. It cut them instead. The Trans-Pacific Partnership promised to counter China and boost exports. It never happened because other countries used the same agreements to undercut each other's markets. NAFTA, signed with predictions of shared prosperity, saw Mexican wages stagnate and American manufacturing jobs vanish into Mexico, Central America, and Asia. The World Bank and the IMF knew these outcomes would occur. Their own research showed that opening borders without protecting domestic workers produces winners and losers, concentrated by geography and sector.
Why do governments keep signing deals that fail their own workers? The answer is simple: corporate lobbies write the rules. The US Chamber of Commerce, the European Business Federation, and industry groups spend billions pushing governments to open markets. They employ thousands of lawyers and economists. Workers' unions have one percent of that firepower. When negotiators sit at the table, business interests literally draft the chapters. A leaked text from the EU-Mercosur talks showed corporate lawyers proposing language that gave foreign firms rights to sue governments if regulations hurt their profits. No labor group sat at that table.
The numbers tell the story plainly. In countries that signed major trade deals, wage growth slowed in the five years after signing compared to the five years before. Manufacturing employment dropped. Small and medium businesses in protected sectors often collapsed because they could not compete with cheap imports from countries with lower labor standards and lax environmental rules. Larger corporations with global supply chains thrived. Inequality measures like the Gini coefficient worsened in nearly every case. Government revenues fell because tariffs dropped and tax competition increased as corporations relocated to jurisdictions with lower rates.
Politicians still sell these agreements using the same old language: growth, jobs, shared prosperity. The public has stopped believing it. Voters across the Western world now oppose new trade deals by margins of 60 to 70 percent. They watched their neighbors' factories close. They saw their wages flat for two decades while corporate profits tripled. They understand what the data confirms: free trade agreements were never written to benefit them. They were written for shareholders and executives. Everything else was theater.
Published June 3, 2026 · Frisian News · Ljouwert, Fryslân