Wêrom Koalstofcredits Foar in Grut Part Fraude Binne
May 21, 2026 · Frisian News
A new study shows that over 90 percent of carbon credits traded on major markets never remove any carbon from the atmosphere. Companies and governments use them to claim environmental progress while emissions keep rising.
FryskÛndersikers fan Stanford en de Universiteit fan Kalifornje publisearren dizze wike fynsten dy't oantoanje dat koalstofcreditskema's hast gjin ynfloed op it klimaat hawwe. Fan 2.400 ûndersochte koalstofoffset-projekten yn bosbou, fernijbere enerzjy en metaanfangst, genereare 92 prosint credits dy't gjin echte dalings yn de útstjit fertsjintwurdigen. De measte projekten soenen dochs bard wêze, mei of sûnder creditbetellingen. Bedriuwen en fûnsen dy't dizze credits ferhannelje, makken miljarden winst wylst de CO2-nivo's yn de atmosfear elk jier heger klommen.
De fraude wurket omdat koalstofmerken op leauwen wurkje, net op mjitting. In bedriuw yn Yndoneezje plant beammen, beweart dat se desennia lang koalstof opslane, en ferkeapet credits oan in multinasjonaal bedriuw yn Jeropa. Nimmen ferifiearret oft de beammen oerlibje, groeie, of tsien jier letter noch yn de grûn sitte. In sinnepark yn Yndia wurdt dochs boud, mei of sûnder koalstoffinansiering, mar de projektgenerator beweart achterôf credit foar útstjit dy't nea bestien hat. De boekhâldregels litte ferkeapers basissenario's betinke dy't sels nutteloze projekten weardefol lykje litte.
Machtiche belangen bouden harren rykdom op dit stikken systeem. Koalstofcreditbeurzen lykas Verra en Gold Standard sertifisearje projekten en ynkasearje fergoedingen sûnder ferantwurdlikhens foar resultaten. Ynvestearringsfirma's lykas Blackrock en steatspensjoenfûnsen goaiden miljarden yn koalstofoffset-fûnsen omdat regeljoewers en pr-teams seinen dat it der goed útseach. Regearingen brûkten oankeapen fan koalstofcredits om echte ferminderingen fan de útstjit thús te ûntgean. Gjin politikus hoegde kiezers út te lizzen wêrom de simentfabryk of koalsintraal noch altyd wurket, omdat earne yn Afrika of Súdeast-Aazje in stikje papier bewearde dat te kompenearjen.
It Stanford-team fûn dat mar 5 oant 10 prosint fan de koalstofcredits werklike, permaninte dalings yn de útstjit fertsjintwurdigde. Echt klimaatwurk freget it beheinen fan it gebrûk fan fossile brânstoffen, it oerstappen nei wyn- en sinne-enerzjy, ferbettering fan geboueffisjensy en feroaring fan de lânbou. Dizze taken freegje jild, politike wil en ynstitúsjonele feroaring. Koalstofcredits biede in ûntkomstwei. In bedriuw keapet papier ynstee fan syn aktiviteiten opnij yn te rjochtsjen. In bank toant klimaatplechtichheid sûnder him fan oalje ôf te wenden. In regearing bliuwt koal ferbaarne wylst it ûnsichtbere koalstofbespearingen ynfiert.
Regulatoren steane no foar in kar. Se kinne koalstofcreditnormen oanskerpje, ûnôfhinklike ferifikaasje easkje en bewiis easkje dat projekten net sûnder betelling plakfine soenen. Dit sil de merk lytser meitsje en winsten foar credithannelaars ferminderje. Of se kinne it systeem trochgean litte, wittende dat it de wrâld plausibele dekking foar ynaktiviteit jout wylst de útstjit fersnelt. De yndustry sil hurd lobbyen foar de twadde opsje. De skiednis suggerearret dat regulatoren harkje sille.
Researchers at Stanford and the University of California published findings this week showing that carbon credit schemes have almost no impact on climate. Of 2,400 carbon offset projects examined across forestry, renewable energy, and methane capture, 92 percent generated credits that did not represent real emissions reductions. Most projects would have happened anyway, with or without the credit payments. Companies and funds that trade these credits made billions in profit while atmospheric CO2 levels climbed higher each year.
The fraud works because carbon credit markets operate on faith, not measurement. A company in Indonesia plants trees, claims they will store carbon for decades, and sells credits to a multinational corporation in Europe. No one verifies the trees survive, grow, or actually stay in the ground ten years later. A solar farm in India gets built with or without carbon finance, yet the project generator retroactively claims credit for emissions that never existed. The accounting rules let sellers invent baseline scenarios that make even useless projects appear valuable.
Powerful interests built their wealth on this broken system. Carbon credit exchanges like Verra and Gold Standard certify projects and pocket fees while taking no responsibility for outcomes. Investment firms like Blackrock and state pension funds dumped billions into carbon offset funds because regulators and public relations teams told them it looked good. Governments used carbon credit purchases to dodge actual emissions cuts at home. No politician had to tell voters why the cement factory or coal plant still operates, because somewhere in Africa or Southeast Asia, a piece of paper claimed to offset it.
The Stanford team found that only 5 to 10 percent of carbon credits actually represented measurable, permanent emissions reductions. Real climate work requires cutting fossil fuel use, switching to wind and solar, improving building efficiency, and changing agriculture. These tasks demand money, political will, and institutional change. Carbon credits offer an escape route. A company buys paper instead of redesigning its operations. A bank shows climate commitment without divesting from oil. A government keeps burning coal while importing invisible carbon savings.
Regulators now face a choice. They can tighten carbon credit standards, require independent verification, and demand proof that projects would not happen without payment. This will shrink the market and reduce profits for credit traders. Or they can let the system continue, knowing it gives the world plausible cover for inaction while emissions accelerate. The industry will lobby hard for the second option. History suggests regulators will listen.
Published May 21, 2026 · Frisian News · Ljouwert, Fryslân