Wêrom Banken Bliuwe Groeien Nettsjinsteande Finansjele Krises
October 24, 2025 · Frisian News
Two decades after the 2008 crash, the world's largest banks control more assets than ever. Governments rescued them then, and nothing structural changed to stop them from growing larger still.
FryskOp in novimber-middei yn 2008 dielde it Amerikaanske Ministearje fan Finânsjes rêdingsjild út oan de grutste banken fan Amearika. JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America en Citigroup krigen hûnderten miljarden. It publyk krige te hearren dat dizze yntervinsjes it systeem foar ynstorting bewaarden. Wat folge wie lykwols gjin herfoarming mar konsolidasje. De rêde giganten kochten lytsere rivalen tsjin dumppriizen en slokten se op. Hjoed oerskride de aktiva fan JPMorgan 4 biljoen dollar. De Grutte Fjouwer banken yn Amearika behearskje no hast twa tredde fan alle depozito's. It systeem is mear konsintreare, net minder.
Regearingen beweare dat se harren les leard hawwe. Regelgevers skriuwen tûzenen siden nije regels nei 2008. Stresstesten, kapitaalbuffers en fallisemintssenario's foar banken binne no op papier. Mar dizze regels hawwe de banken net lytser makke of harren berik beheind. Yn plak dêrfan binne se barrières foar nije yntrêders dy't lytsere konkurrinten net oerkomme kinne. De kosten fan neilibjen foelen it hurdst op mienskipsbanken en regionale spilers. De giganten koenen dizze kosten opfange. De lytsere banken net. Konsolidasje fersnelle.
Politisy en sintrale bankiers steane foar in fûneminteel probleem. Se binne bang foar wat bart as in megabank omfalt. De ferbinings rinne sa djip, fia skaduwbanknetwurken en derivatenmerkten, dat gjin amtner echt teste wol wat in echte ynstorting betsjut. Se foarkomme ynstorting troch de grutste bedriuwen oerein te hâlden. Dit skept moreel gefaar. Banken witte dat de steat harren net sinke lit. Se nimme gruttere risiko's, boeke mear winst, en brûke dat jild om yn oanbuorjende merkten yn te brekken. Elke krisis makket harren sterker, net swakker.
De regionale bankfalliseminten yn Amearika yn 2023 toanden hoe it systeem wurket. Silicon Valley Bank en Signature Bank beswiken. De federale regearing dekte alle depozito's, sels dy boppe de fersekere limyt fan 250.000 dollar per rekken. It boadskip wie dúdlik: binne jo grut en goed ferbûn, dan stipet de steat jo. Klanten fan lytsere banken learden dat hja jild ferlieze soenen. Klanten fan systeemkrusjale banken learden dat hja net ferlieze soenen. Kapitaal streame fan de marzje nei it sintrum.
De grutte banken opdiele bliuwt polityk ûnmooglik. Tefolle politisy krije kampanjejild fan Wall Street. Tefolle regelgevers komme út dy bedriuwen en plannen werom te gean. De draaidoar draait. De banken groeie. It systeem wurdt brizzich, net feiliger, omdat konsintraasje ien inkeld punt fan falen skept. As it breekt, betellet it publyk. Oant politisy echte gefolgen ûnderfine foar de ferdigening fan de status quo, feroaret neat.
On a November afternoon in 2008, the U.S. Treasury handed out bailout money to the largest banks in America. JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Citigroup received hundreds of billions. The public was told these interventions saved the system from collapse. What followed, though, was not reform but consolidation. The rescued giants bought smaller rivals at fire-sale prices and swallowed them whole. Today, JPMorgan's assets exceed 4 trillion dollars. The Big Four banks in America now command nearly two-thirds of all deposits. The system is more concentrated, not less.
Governments claim they learned their lesson. Regulators wrote thousands of pages of new rules after 2008. Stress tests, capital buffers, and living wills for bankrupt firms now exist on paper. But these rules have not shrunk the banks or limited their reach. Instead, they have become barriers to entry that smaller competitors cannot scale. The cost of compliance fell hardest on community banks and regional players. The giants could absorb these costs. The smaller ones could not. Consolidation accelerated.
Politicians and central bankers face a basic problem. They fear what happens if a mega-bank fails. The interconnections run so deep, through shadow banking networks and derivatives markets, that no official wants to test what a real collapse looks like. So they prevent collapse by propping up the largest firms. This creates moral hazard. Banks know the state will not let them sink. They take bigger risks, earn larger profits, and use that money to buy their way into adjacent markets. Each crisis makes them stronger, not weaker.
The 2023 regional bank failures in America showed how the system works. Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank collapsed. The federal government covered all deposits, even those above the insured limit of 250,000 dollars per account. The message was clear: if you are big enough and well-connected, the state backs you. Customers of smaller banks learned they might lose money. Customers of systemically important banks learned they would not. Capital flowed from the fringe to the core.
Breaking up the big banks remains politically impossible. Too many politicians receive campaign money from Wall Street. Too many regulators come from those firms and plan to return. The revolving door spins. The banks grow. The system becomes more fragile, not safer, because concentration creates a single point of failure. When it breaks, the public pays. Until politicians face real consequences for defending the status quo, nothing will change.
Published October 24, 2025 · Frisian News · Ljouwert, Fryslân