It Jeugdwurkleazensprobleem dat Nimmen Oplost
November 3, 2025 · Frisian News
Youth unemployment across Europe remains stubbornly high despite decades of policy interventions, with young people facing weak wages and unstable work. Governments spend billions on training schemes that rarely lead to lasting jobs.
FryskOp in tiisdeimoarns yn Amsterdam sit in 24-jierrige mei de namme Marcus foar de tredde kear dizze moanne yn in arbeidsburo. Hy hat in diploma yn logistyk mar wurket sûnt twa jier allinnich ûnder tydlike kontrakten. Syn dossier telt no fjirtich siden, fol mei nammen fan trainingen, learlingsskema's en subsydzjeprogramma's. Gjin ien dêrfan hat ta in fêste baan laat. Marcus stiet net allinnich, en dit is gjin nij probleem. Yn hiel Europa leit de jeugdwurkleazens tusken 15 en 25 prosint, ôfhinklik fan it lân, en folle mear jongeren sitte fêst yn prekaer, leechbetelle wurk sûnder echte foarútgong. Regearingen hawwe tritich jier lang enorme bedragen oan dizze krisis bestege. Dútslân joech miljarden út oan duale trainingsystemen. Frankryk lansearre inisjatyven foar jeugdwurk. Grut-Brittanje besocht wurkgarânsjes. Nederlân makke learlingsskema's mei subsydzjes. Dochs is it basisbyld net feroare. Jongeren ferlitte skoalle en universiteit op in arbeidsmerk dy't harren as weiwerpprodukt behannelet. Wurkjouwers easkje fiif jier ûnderfining foar ynstapbanen. Befriezingen fan it iepenbiere amtnersskip eliminearje it stabile wurk dat eartiids jeugdkarriêres stipe. It echte probleem leit net yn in tekoart oan training mar yn de wegering fan wurkjouwers en politisy harren fêst te lizzen oan fêste banen en libbensweardich lean.
De skema's sels tsjinje faak earder oan polityk teater as oan echte wurkgelegenheid. In regearing makket in inisjatyf fan fiif miljoen euro mei grutte ophef bekend. Konsultants ûntwerpje it programma. In hânfol jongeren krije kursussen dy't nimmen hawwe wol. As it kontrakt ôfrint, ferdwynt it programma en de jongere giet werom nei útsentwurk of wurkleazens. Statistiken toane hegere wurkgelegenheidspersintaazjes allinnich om't regearingen subsydjearre posysjes as echte banen telle. Sa gau't de subsydzje einiget, ferdwynt de posysje. De echte priis fan dit falen falt folslein op de jonge wurknimmers, dy't houlik, âlderskip en wenningbesit útstelle wylst se wachtsje op in stabiliteit dy't noait komt. It strukturele probleem bliuwt ûnsichtber yn beliedsdiskusjes. Grutte bedriuwen profitearje fan it ynnimmen fan jongeren op koarte kontrakten, harren minder betelje en harren weigoaie as de wurkdruk daalt. Fakbûnen binne ferswakke, dus ûnderhannelje net mear oer beskerming fan jongeren. Lytsere bedriuwen beweare dat se gjin permanint personiel betelje kinne, mar de eigentlike reden is dat nimmen harren dwingt. Regearingen jouwe de foarkar oan goedkeape programma's dy't wurkleaze jongeren troch kantoaren skowe ynstee fan wurkjouwers te regulearjen of harren fêst te lizzen oan direkte baanskepping. Dizze oanpak kostet polityk minder, hoewol it yn minsklike termen folle mear kostet.
Marcus sil wierskynlik úteinlik wurk fine, wierskynlik mei lean fier ûnder wat syn oplieding suggerearret. Hy sil tusken wurkjouwers wikselje, om de achttjin moannen, sûnder loyaliteit op te bouwen en sûnder foardielen. Syn generaasje sil de tritich yngean earmer en lilker as harren âlders. Salang't politisy net tajaan dat de merk dit allinnich net oplosse sil, dat wurkjouwers regels nedich hawwe en dat stabile oerheidsbanen derta dogge, sil neat feroarje. It jeugdwurkleazensprobleem sil bliuwe bestean om't nimmen mei macht de priis betelje wol om it op te lossen.
On a Tuesday morning in Amsterdam, a 24-year-old named Marcus sits in a job centre office for the third time this month. He holds a degree in logistics but has worked only temporary contracts since graduation two years ago. His case file now runs to forty pages, filled with the names of training courses, apprenticeship programs, and subsidy schemes. None have led to a permanent job. Marcus is not alone, and this is not a new problem. Across Europe, youth unemployment hovers between 15 and 25 percent depending on the country, with many more young people locked in precarious, low-wage work that provides no real pathway forward.
Governments have thrown enormous sums at this crisis for thirty years. Germany spent billions on dual training systems. France launched youth employment initiatives. Britain tried work guarantees. The Netherlands created apprenticeship subsidies. Yet the basic picture has not changed. Young people leave school and university into a labor market that treats them as disposable. Employers demand five years of experience for entry-level jobs. Public-sector hiring freezes eliminate the stable work that once anchored young careers. The real problem lies not in training gaps but in the refusal of employers and politicians to commit to permanent positions and living wages.
The schemes themselves often serve political theater more than actual employment. A government announces a five-million-euro initiative with fanfare. Consultants design the program. A handful of young people cycle through courses that teach skills no one wants. When the contract ends, the program vanishes, and the young person returns to temp work or joblessness. Statistics show higher employment rates only because governments count subsidized positions as real jobs. Once the subsidy ends, the position disappears. The real cost of this failure falls entirely on young workers, who delay marriage, parenthood, and home ownership while waiting for stability that never comes.
The structural issue remains invisible in policy debates. Large firms profit from hiring young workers on short contracts, paying them less, and discarding them when workload drops. Unions have weakened, so they no longer bargain for youth protections. Small businesses claim they cannot afford permanent staff, yet the real reason is that no one forces them to. Governments prefer cheap programs that shuffle unemployed youth through offices rather than regulate employers or commit public money to direct job creation. This approach costs less politically, though it costs far more in human terms.
Marcus will likely find work eventually, probably at wages far below what his education suggests he deserves. He will move between employers every eighteen months, building no loyalty and earning no benefits. His generation will enter their thirties poorer and angrier than their parents. Until politicians admit that the market alone will not solve this, that employers need rules, and that stable public-sector jobs matter, nothing will change. The youth unemployment problem will persist because no one with power wants to pay the price to fix it.
Published November 3, 2025 · Frisian News · Ljouwert, Fryslân