The Youth Unemployment Problem Nobody Has Solved
November 3, 2025 · Frisian News
Youth unemployment across Europe remains stubbornly high despite decades of policy interventions, with young people facing weak wages and unstable work. Governments spend billions on training schemes that rarely lead to lasting jobs.
On a Tuesday morning in Amsterdam, a 24-year-old named Marcus sits in a job centre office for the third time this month. He holds a degree in logistics but has worked only temporary contracts since graduation two years ago. His case file now runs to forty pages, filled with the names of training courses, apprenticeship programs, and subsidy schemes. None have led to a permanent job. Marcus is not alone, and this is not a new problem. Across Europe, youth unemployment hovers between 15 and 25 percent depending on the country, with many more young people locked in precarious, low-wage work that provides no real pathway forward.
Governments have thrown enormous sums at this crisis for thirty years. Germany spent billions on dual training systems. France launched youth employment initiatives. Britain tried work guarantees. The Netherlands created apprenticeship subsidies. Yet the basic picture has not changed. Young people leave school and university into a labor market that treats them as disposable. Employers demand five years of experience for entry-level jobs. Public-sector hiring freezes eliminate the stable work that once anchored young careers. The real problem lies not in training gaps but in the refusal of employers and politicians to commit to permanent positions and living wages.
The schemes themselves often serve political theater more than actual employment. A government announces a five-million-euro initiative with fanfare. Consultants design the program. A handful of young people cycle through courses that teach skills no one wants. When the contract ends, the program vanishes, and the young person returns to temp work or joblessness. Statistics show higher employment rates only because governments count subsidized positions as real jobs. Once the subsidy ends, the position disappears. The real cost of this failure falls entirely on young workers, who delay marriage, parenthood, and home ownership while waiting for stability that never comes.
The structural issue remains invisible in policy debates. Large firms profit from hiring young workers on short contracts, paying them less, and discarding them when workload drops. Unions have weakened, so they no longer bargain for youth protections. Small businesses claim they cannot afford permanent staff, yet the real reason is that no one forces them to. Governments prefer cheap programs that shuffle unemployed youth through offices rather than regulate employers or commit public money to direct job creation. This approach costs less politically, though it costs far more in human terms.
Marcus will likely find work eventually, probably at wages far below what his education suggests he deserves. He will move between employers every eighteen months, building no loyalty and earning no benefits. His generation will enter their thirties poorer and angrier than their parents. Until politicians admit that the market alone will not solve this, that employers need rules, and that stable public-sector jobs matter, nothing will change. The youth unemployment problem will persist because no one with power wants to pay the price to fix it.
Op in tsiisdagochtend yn Amsterdam sit in 24-jarige neamd Marcus foar de tredde kear dizze moanne yn in arbreidsbureau. Hy hat in diploma yn logistyk mar wurket sûnt twa jier allinne ûnder tydlike kontrakten. Syn dosk telt no fjirtich siden, fol mei nammen fan trainings, lierlingskema's en subsidjeprogramma's. Gjin fan har hat ta in fêste baan lidd. Marcus stiet net allinne, en dit is gjin nij probleem. Yn hiel Jeropa lit de jongprofessionele wurkleazens tusken 15 en 25 persint, ôfhinklik fan it lân, en folle mear jonge minsken sitten fast yn prekêr, leachbetiald wurk sûnder echte foarútgong. Regeringen hawwe tritich jier lang enoarme bedragen oan dizze krisis bestutsen. Dútslân gaf miljarden út oan duale trainingsystemen. Frankryk lansearje inisjativen foar jongeswurk. Grut-Britanje probearre wurkgaransjes. De Niderlanden makken lierlingskema's mei subsidjes. Dochs is it basispiktuere net feroare. Jonge minsken ferliuwe skoalle en universiteit op in arbeidsmerket dat har as weachwerpprodukt behannele. Wurkjouwers eisje fiif jier ûnderfiening foar ynstappbanen. Ynfriers fan it iepenber ambtennerskip eliminearje it stabile wurk dat oars jongeswurk-karrieres ûndersteunde. It echte probleem lit net yn in tekort oan training mar yn de wegerring fan wurkjouwers en politisy om harren oan fêste banen en libbensakfan-leane fêst te leggjen.
De skema's sels tsjinje gauris earder oan politike teater dan oan echte boanmeitsing. In regjering kondizearret in inisjatif fan fiif miljoen euro mei grut gefolch. Konsultants ûntwerpe it programma. In hânful jonge minsken krije koarsen dy't nimmen wol hawwe. Wannear't it kontrak ein komt, ferdwine it programma en de jonge minske keert werôf nei útsentwurk of wurkleazennis. Statistiken toanen hegere boanmeitsingspersentaazjes allinne omdat regeringen subsidjeare posysjes as echte banen telle. Skonst de subsidje eindige, ferdwine de posysje. De echte kostprys fan dizze tüchmasking falt hielâld op de jonge wurkers, dy't huwlik, âlderskip en hûsebizit útstelje wiel se op in stabilitayt wachtsje dy't noait komt. It strukturele probleem bliuwt ûnsichtber yn beliedsdebatten. Grutte bedriuwen profitearje fan it ynhiurin fan jonge minsken op koarte kontrakten, har folie betale en har weachgoaie wannear't de wurklêst falt. Vakbûnen binne ferswekke, dus underhandle net mear oer beskerming fan jongen. Lytse bedriuwen klame dat se gjin permanint persuniel betellje kinne, mar de werklike reden is dat nimmen harren twingje. Regeringen jouwwe foarkeur oan goedkeape programma's dy't wurkleaze jonge minsken troch kantoren skuofje yn stee fan wurkjouwers te regulearje of harren oan direkte boanmeitsing fêst te leggjen. Dizze oanpak kostje polityk minder, hoewol se yn minsklike termen folle mear kostje.
Marcus sil wierskynlik úteinlik wurk fine, wierskynlik mei leanen fer ûnder wat syn ûnderwiis suggearret. Hy sil tusken wurkjouwers skakelje, om in achttjin moannten, sûnder loyaliteit op te bouwen en sûnder foardielen. Syn generaasje sil har tritich yngean earmer en oareler as har âlders. Skoest politisy net tsjowwe dat de merket dit allinne net sil oplosse, dat wurkjouwers regels nedich hawwe en dat stabile openberbaansbanen dertoe derjochte, sil neat feroarje. It jongprofessionele wurkleazenssprobleem sil bliuwe besteane omdat nimmen mei macht de prys wol betelle om it op te losjen.
Published November 3, 2025 · Frisian News · Ljouwert, Fryslân