De Leveringskettingmytte: Wêrom 'Reshoring' Net Plakfynt
May 10, 2026 · Frisian News
Western governments and corporations promise to bring manufacturing home, but the numbers reveal a different story. Factory jobs remain overseas while costs and politics keep reshoring a distant dream.
FryskYn maart kundige in grut Nederlânsk elektroanikabedriuw mei in soad praal oan dat it in nije fabryk yn Roemenië iepenje soe, in stap dy't direkteuren in 'reshoring-inisjatyf' foar East-Europa neamden. De werklikheid bliek folle ienfâldiger. It bedriuw brocht produksje net fanút Aazje werom. It iepene in nije fêstiging foar besteande aktiviteiten dy't al dêr plakfûnen, en betelle wurknimmers om ende by in tredde fan wat it kostje soe yn Nederlân. Dit patroan werhellet him yn hiel Europa en Amearika, dêr't politisy reshoring-tasizzingen trompetterje wylst bedriuwen yn stilte fabrieken bouwe dêr't arbeid it goadkeapste bliuwt.
It reshoring-ferhaal griep politisy fêst nei de pandemy, doe't brosse leveringskettingen kwetsber bliken en de Oekraïne-oarloch it gasoanfier nei Dútske fabrieken ûnderbiek. Sawol de Europeeske Uny as de Feriene Steaten tasizzen lokale produksjekapasiteit opnij op te bouwen. Europa lansearre miljarden oan subsydzjes. De Inflation Reduction Act fan Amearika bea belestingkrediten oan foar binnenlânske produksje. Dochs sjocht de wrâldwide leveringsketting fiif jier letter der folle itselde út. Sina bliuwt de fabryksmotor. Vietnam en Yndia groeiden hurder as elk Europeesk lân yn fabryksproduksje.
Wêrom wurket reshoring net nettsjinsteande oerheidsstipe en beloften fan bedriuwen? Kosten bliuwe hurd en earlik. In wurknimmer yn Vietnam kostet om ende by acht dollar de oere oan lean en sosjale lêsten. Itselde wurknimmer yn Dútslân of Nederlân kostet 35 oant 40 dollar. Sels mei subsydzjes slút gjin bedrach oan griene ferve en praatsjes oer 'strategyske ûnôfhinklikheid' in gat sa grut. Automatisearring helpt, mar ferfangt wurknimmers ynstee fan de stabile fabrieken dy't politisy kiezers tasein hienen.
Bedriuwen learden ek dat sy gjin fabrieken op Europeeske grûn nedich hawwe om Europeeske klanten te betsjinjen. Sy brûke no fluch transport en fleksibele leveringsroutes. In kontener út Shanghai berikket Rotterdam yn 30 dagen. De just-in-time-systemen fan de jierren njoggentich hawwe plak makke foar just-in-case-foarrieden ferspraat oer ferskate kontinenten. Dizze oanpak kostet mear mar spriedt risiko. Hy hâldt ek produksjekosten leech, wat foar oandielhâlders folle mear útmakket as nasjonale grutskens of leveringsfeilichheid.
It reshoring-ferhaal tsjinnet in politike funksje. It stelt regearingen yn steat te bewearen dat sy har yndustriële basis weroropbouwe wylst sy tsjeks útskriuwe dy't bedriuwen eins helpe nei goadkeapere regio's út te jaan. Boargers hearre fan nije fabrieken en groei fan wurkplakken. Sy sjogge selden de lytse letters dêr't yn stiet dat wurkplakken tydlik binne, leanen leech binne, en fabrieken sels ticht gean sille as subsydzjes opdroegje. Leveringskettingen binne net thúskeard. Sy binne gewoan earliker wurden oer dêr't wearde werklik hinne streamt.
In March, a major Dutch electronics manufacturer announced with great fanfare that it would open a new factory in Romania, a move executives called a 'reshoring initiative' for Eastern Europe. The reality proved far simpler. The company was not returning production from Asia. It was opening a new facility to serve existing operations already based there, paying workers roughly one-third what it would cost in the Netherlands. This pattern repeats across Europe and America, where politicians trumpet reshoring commitments while companies quietly build factories wherever labor remains cheapest.
The reshoring narrative gripped Western policymakers after the pandemic exposed fragile supply chains and the Ukraine war disrupted gas supplies to German factories. Both the European Union and United States promised to rebuild local manufacturing capacity. Europe launched billions in subsidy schemes. America's Inflation Reduction Act dangled tax credits for domestic production. Yet five years later, global supply chains look much as they did before. China remains the manufacturing hub. Vietnam and India have grown faster than any European nation in factory output.
Why does reshoring fail despite government money and corporate promises? Cost remains brutal and honest. A worker in Vietnam costs roughly 8 dollars per hour in wages and benefits. The same worker in Germany or the Netherlands costs 35 to 40 dollars. Even with subsidies, no amount of green paint and talk of 'strategic autonomy' closes a gap that wide. Automation helps, but it replaces workers rather than creating the stable manufacturing jobs politicians promised to voters.
Companies also learned they do not need factories on European soil to serve European customers. They now use rapid shipping and flexible supply routes. A container from Shanghai reaches Rotterdam in 30 days. The just-in-time systems of the 1990s have given way to just-in-case stockpiling scattered across multiple continents. This approach costs more but spreads risk. It also keeps production costs low, which matters far more to shareholders than national pride or supply chain resilience.
The reshoring story serves a political function. It allows governments to claim they are rebuilding their industrial base while writing checks that actually support companies offshoring to cheaper regions. Citizens hear about new factories and job growth. They rarely see the fine print revealing that the jobs are temporary, the wages low, and the factories themselves will close within a decade when subsidies run dry. Supply chains have not returned home. They have simply become more honest about where value actually moves.
Published May 10, 2026 · Frisian News · Ljouwert, Fryslân