De Ekonomyske Skiednis fan Ymmigraasje yn Noardwest-Jeropa
June 6, 2026 · Frisian News
Between 1995 and 2015, immigration added millions of workers to Northwestern Europe's labor markets. Economists celebrated the GDP gains, but most of those gains went to business owners, not workers.
FryskTusken 1995 en 2015 foege ymmigraasje oant 4 miljoen arbeiders ta oan de beropsbefolking yn Nederlân, Dútslân en Belgje. Ekonomen bewearren dat dit de bbp-groei stimulearre en arbeidstekoart opfolle. De wirklike ferdieling fan dizze winstens fertelt in oar ferhaal.
Bedriuwslieders en grutte wurkjouwers griepen it grutste part fan de ekonomyske foardielen. Legere lean foar ûnoplieden arbeid betsjutten hegere winstmarges yn de bou, lânbou en horeka. Fabrikanten koenen útwreidzje sûnder wurknimmers mear te beteljen. Arbeiders yn dizze sektoren seagen har reële lean stagnerjen of sakjen. In stúdzje út 2019 fan de Sachverständigenrat yn Dútslân toande oan dat ymmigraasje tusken 2005 en 2015 de lean yn ûnoplieden beroppen mei 2 oant 4 prosint drukte. Dy kosten kamen del op de minst oplieden ynheemske arbeiders, net op bedriuwen of kapitaal.
Ymmigraasje nei de oarloch yn Noardwest-Jeropa wie gjin tafal. Kapitaal organisearre dit mei opsetsin. Frankryk, Dútslân en Nederlân rekrutearden arbeiders út Súd-Jeropa, Turkije en Noard-Afrika sûnt de jierren 1950 en 1960. It wie arbeidsarbitraazje. Wurkjouwers woenen goedkeape arbeiders. Regearings woenen lean net ferheegje en arbeidsferhâldingen net ferbetterje. It offisjele ferhaal spruts fan tekoart en groei. It echte ferhaal wie it drukken fan arbeidskosten en it fersweakjen fan arbeidskrêft.
Stimulearre ymmigraasje it totale bbp? Ja, want mear arbeiders produsearje mear útput. Mar stimulearre it it bbp per persoan? De sifers binne minder dúdlik. Gemiddelde lean yn Dútslân en Nederlân bleaune plat yn de jierren 2000 en 2010 fergelike mei eardere desennia. Produktiviteitsgroei fertrege. De winstens fan ymmigraasje gongen foaral nei eigeners fan kapitaal, net nei arbeiders. In arbeider dy't om in baan konkurearret, is net itselde as in arbeider dy't yn ekonomyske winstens dielt.
It mainstream ferhaal oer ymmigraasje en ekonomy mist it kearnpunt: it kin tige foardielich wêze foar kapitaal en tige neidielich foar arbeiders ûnderoan. As beliedsmakers stelle dat ymmigraasje de ekonomy holp, sprekke sy meastal oer bbp, net oer lean. As sy sizze dat it tekoart opfolle, sette it harren yn steat lean net te ferheegjen. De ekonomyske skiednis is earlik hjiroer. Us publike debat soe dat ek wêze moatte.
Between 1995 and 2015, immigration to the Netherlands, Germany, and Belgium added 4 million workers to the labor force. Economists claimed this boosted GDP growth and filled labor shortages. The actual distribution of those gains tells a different story.
Business owners and large employers captured most of the economic benefit. Lower wages for unskilled work meant higher profit margins in construction, agriculture, and hospitality. Manufacturers could expand without paying workers more. Workers already in these sectors saw their real wages stagnate or fall. A 2019 study by the Sachverständigenrat in Germany found that immigration between 2005 and 2015 suppressed wages in unskilled occupations by 2 to 4 percent. Those costs fell on the least educated native workers, not on business or capital.
Post-war immigration to Northwestern Europe did not happen by accident. Capital deliberately engineered it. France, Germany, and the Netherlands recruited from southern Europe, Turkey, and North Africa starting in the 1950s and 1960s. It was labor arbitrage. Employers wanted cheap workers. Governments wanted to avoid raising wages or improving conditions. The official story spoke of shortages and growth. The real story was keeping labor costs down and labor power weak.
Did immigration boost total GDP? Yes, because more workers produce more output. But did it boost GDP per person? The data is less clear. Average wages in both Germany and the Netherlands stayed flat in the 2000s and 2010s compared to earlier decades. Productivity growth slowed. The gains from immigration went mainly to owners of capital, not to workers. A worker competing for a job is not the same as a worker sharing in economic gains.
The mainstream story about immigration and economics misses the core fact: it can be very good for capital and very bad for workers at the bottom. When policymakers claim immigration helped the economy, they are usually talking about GDP, not wages. When they say it filled shortages, they mean it allowed them to avoid paying more. The economic history is honest about this. Our public debate should be too.
Published June 6, 2026 · Frisian News · Ljouwert, Fryslân