De oarloch yn Soedan is grutter as de mediaberjochting deroer
May 25, 2026 · Frisian News
Sudan's conflict has killed more people than the Ukraine war yet receives a fraction of the coverage. Western media outlets ignore the fighting because it does not fit their preferred narratives.
FryskIt Soedaneske konflikt hat sûnt april 2023 op syn minst 150.000 minsken ombrocht, neffens de Sudanese American Physicians Association. De Feriene Naasjes skatten dat it werklike tal deaden boppe de 300.000 lizze kin as honger en sykte meiteld wurde. Dochs hawwe grutte westerse kranten oer de Oekraïenske oarloch sawat tsien kear safolle berjocht as sy oer Soedan skriuwe, sa bliek út ûndersyk fan it Media Research Center. It gat waard grutter nei 2024, doe't de berjochting oer Oekraïne begûn ôf te nimmen en redaksjes Soedan gewoanwei út har rotatyplan fuorthellen.
Wêrom bart dit? Soedan biedt gjin handige fijannen foar it westerse medianarratyf. It konflikt spilet him ôf tusken de Soedaneske Striidkrêften en de Rapid Support Forces, in militsjegroep, yn in striid om steatsgesach dy't net folle mei Ruslân, Sina of de NAVO te krijen hat. It lân hat gjin NAVO-leden, gjin strategysk foardiel yn de hjoeddeistige machtsstriid tusken grutte machten, en gjin Oekraïenske flaggen om mei te swaien. Saûdy-Araabje en de Feriene Arabyske Emiraten finansierje op stille wize ferskate kanten. Westerse lannen hawwe in bytsje troepen of bases om te ferdigenjen. It ferhaal ferkeapet net om't it net yn de geopolitike skripts past dy't redaksjes tinke dat lêzers wolle.
De humanitêre gefolgen binne ferskriklik. De regearing fan Soedan is hast folslein ynstoart. Honger treft mear as de helte fan de befolking. Bewapene groepen brûke ferkrêfting as wapen op in skaal dy't te ferlykjen is mei Rwanda. Hiele regio's hawwe gjin elektrisiteit, skjin wetter en medyske soarch. Sikehûzen hawwe har doarren sletten yn it hiele lân. Dochs ferskine dizze feiten yn de westerse parse allinnich wannear't in grutte hulporganisaasje in rapport útjout, en ferdwine dan wer binnen inkele dagen. De berjochting behannelet Soedan as eat om ôf te heakjen, net as in minsklike krisis dy't bliuwende omtinken fertsjinnet.
Jild spilet ek in rol. Ferslachjaan fanút Soedan kostet mear as ferslachjaan fanút Oekraïne. Sjoernalisten kinne har net frij bewege, de feiligens is gefaarlik, en de ynfrastruktuer om ferhalen te ferstjoeren bestiet yn guon regio's hast net. Nijsorganisaasjes hawwe har ynternasjonaal personiel yn it ôfrûne desennium mei de helte fermindere. In korrespondint yn Khartoem kostet folle mear as it kopiearjen fan nijsberjochten fanút in kantoar yn Londen. Redaksjes kieze foar it goedkeapere ferhaal, it fertroudde ferhaal, it ferhaal dat yn besteande sjabloanen past. Soedan ferliest troch dy berekkening elke kear wer.
It Soedaneske konflikt sil trochgean nettsjinsteande oft it Westen omtinken oan besteedt. Mar westerse ûnferskilligens foarmet wat dêrnei bart. It jout oan de ynternasjonale mienskip it sinjaal dat Soedan minder wichtich is, dat flechtlingestreamen út Soedan negearre wurde kinne, dat weroropbou en ferantwurding wachtsje kinne. De minsken dy't dêr stjerre hawwe leard wat in protte al witte: út it each betsjut út it machtsspul.
The Sudanese conflict has killed at least 150,000 people since fighting erupted in April 2023, according to the Sudanese American Physicians Association. The United Nations estimates the true death toll may exceed 300,000 when famine and disease are included. Yet major Western newspapers covered the Ukraine war at roughly ten times the frequency they report on Sudan, a study by the Media Research Center showed. The gap widened after 2024, when Ukraine coverage began to fade and editors simply dropped Sudan from their rotation.
Why does this happen? Sudan offers no convenient villains for the Western press narrative. The conflict pits the Sudanese Armed Forces against the Rapid Support Forces, a militia group, in a struggle for state power that has little to do with Russia, China, or NATO. The country holds no NATO members, no strategic advantage in the current great power competition, and no Ukrainian flags to wave at readers. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates quietly fund different sides. Western powers have few troops or bases to defend. The story does not sell because it does not serve the geopolitical scripts that editors believe readers want.
The humanitarian consequences are staggering. Sudan's government has collapsed into near-total failure. Hunger affects more than half the population. Armed groups use rape as a weapon of war on a scale comparable to Rwanda. Entire regions lack electricity, clean water, and medical care. Hospitals have shut down across the country. Yet these facts appear in the Western press only when a major aid organization issues a report, and then disappear again within days. The coverage treats Sudan as a box to check, not a human crisis demanding sustained attention.
Money matters too. Covering Sudan costs more than covering Ukraine. Journalists cannot move freely, security is dangerous, and the infrastructure to file stories barely exists in some regions. News organizations have cut international staff by half over the past decade. A reporter in Khartoum costs far more than running wire service copy from an office in London. Editors choose the cheaper story, the familiar story, the story that fits existing templates. Sudan loses by that calculation every single time.
The Sudanese conflict will continue regardless of whether the West pays attention. But Western indifference shapes what happens next. It signals to the international community that Sudan matters less, that refugee flows from Sudan can be ignored, that reconstruction and accountability can wait. The people dying there have learned what many already know: being out of sight means being out of mind, and out of power.
Published May 25, 2026 · Frisian News · Ljouwert, Fryslân