Sosjale Media Radikalisearret Jongerein. Links en Rjochts.
March 1, 2026 · Frisian News
Research shows that algorithmic feeds push young people toward extreme content, regardless of political leaning. The problem afflicts both left and right, yet institutions struggle to address it without censoring speech.
FryskIn 16-jierrige yn Berlyn scrollt twa oere troch clips en giet fan haadstreampolityk nei konspiraasjetheoryen. In 15-jierrige yn São Paulo begjint mei ynhâld oer sosjale gerjochtichheid en sjocht úteinlik fideo's dy't in hiele befolkingsgroep demonisearje. Beide teners folgje itselde paad: it algoritme leart wat har oandacht hâldt en jout har der mear fan. Undersiik dat dizze moanne troch it Berlynske Ynstitút foar Digitale Maatskippij publisearre is, toant oan dat sosjalmediaplatfoarmen ekstreme ynhâld foar jonge brûkers yn it hiele politike spektrum fersterkje, net allinne oan ien kant.
It meganisme wurket as folget. Platfoarmen mjitte belutsenheid. Ekstreme ynhâld generearret belutsenheid. It algoritme jout net om oft dat ekstremisme links of rjochts leit. In fideo oer korrupsje yn de regearing krijt views. In fideo dy't beweart dat in minderheidsgroep tsjin de naasje gearspant krijt views. Beide klimme yn de feed. Beide wurde oanbefelle oan ferlykbere brûkers. Jongerein, wêrfan de harsens har fermogen om boarnen te beoardieljen en bewiis ôf te wegen noch ûntwikkelje, konsumearje dit materiaal op grutte skaal en nimme de framing derfan op as normaal polityk tinken.
Links-ekstremisme fia sosjale media sjocht der oars út as rjochts-ekstremisme, mar it ûnderlizzende probleem bliuwt itselde. In jongere dy't ynteressearre is yn klimaataktivisme rint mooglik ynhâld tsjin dy't sabotaazje foarstiet. Immen dy't identiteitspolityk ferkennet, fynt materiaal dat alle ferskillen fan miening ta ûnderdrukking reduseert. Rjochts rekket immen dy't nijsgjirrich is nei oerheidsútjeften de ferfangingstheory. De paden ferskille, mar de bestimming (swart-wyt tinken, oeral fijannen, persoanlike morele suverheid) bliuwt konsistint yn it hiele spektrum.
Ynstellingen wrakselje mei de reaksje. Regearingen driuwe oan op ynhâldsmoderearring, wat ridlik klinkt oant jo freegje: wa bepaalt wat radikaal is? Links-oriïntearre moderators markearje rjochts-materiaal; rjochts-oriïntearre moderators dogge itselde. Techbedriuwen ferwiderje guon akkounts en litte oaren stean, wêrtroch de yndruk fan foaroardiel ûntstiet, nettsjinsteande oft foaroardiel bestiet. Underwilens bliuwt it algoritme sels ferburgen. Wy kinne net sjen wêrom't dyn feed oars is as de mines, dus wy kinne net sinvol debattearje oft it systeem earlik wurket.
Âlders en skoallen wrakselje hurder as ynstellingen. Se kinne net elk skerm kontrôlearje. Se kinne net konkurrearje mei yngenieurs dy't miljoenen fertsjinje om apps ferslaavjend te meitsjen. Se kinne net útlizze wêrom't har bern no yn slogans praat ynstee fan sinnen. It antwurd leit spitich genôch net yn allinne TikTok ferbiede of Facebook regulearje. It leit yn it feroarjen fan hoe't dizze platfoarmen súkses mjitte. Oant belutsenheid ophâldt winst te betsjutten, sil it algoritme jongerein yn beide rjochtingen bliuwe radikalisearjen.
A 16-year-old in Berlin scrolls through clips for two hours and moves from mainstream politics to conspiracy theories. A 15-year-old in São Paulo starts with social justice content and ends up watching videos that demonize an entire group of people. Both teenagers follow the same path: the algorithm learns what holds their attention and feeds them more of it. Research published this month by the Berlin Institute for Digital Society shows that social media platforms amplify extreme content for young users across the political spectrum, not just one side.
The mechanism works like this. Platforms measure engagement. Extreme content generates engagement. The algorithm does not care whether that extremism sits on the left or the right. A video about government corruption gets views. A video claiming a minority group conspires against the nation gets views. Both climb the feed. Both get recommended to similar users. Young people, whose brains still develop their ability to judge sources and weigh evidence, consume this material at scale and absorb its framing as normal political thought.
Left-wing radicalization through social media looks different from right-wing radicalization, but the underlying problem stays the same. A young person interested in climate activism might encounter accelerationist content that advocates sabotage. Someone exploring identity politics might find material that reduces all disagreement to oppression. On the right, a person curious about government waste encounters replacement theory. The pathways differ, but the destination (black-and-white thinking, enemies everywhere, personal moral purity) remains consistent across the spectrum.
Institutions fumble the response. Governments push for content moderation, which sounds reasonable until you ask: who decides what counts as radical? Left-leaning moderators flag right-wing material; right-leaning moderators do the reverse. Tech companies delete some accounts and leave others standing, producing the impression of bias whether or not bias exists. Meanwhile, the algorithm itself remains hidden. We cannot see why your feed differs from mine, so we cannot meaningfully debate whether the system acts fairly.
Parents and schools struggle harder than institutions. They cannot monitor every screen. They cannot compete with engineers paid millions to make apps addictive. They cannot explain why their child now speaks in slogans instead of sentences. The answer, frustratingly, does not live in banning TikTok or regulating Facebook alone. It lives in changing how these platforms measure success. Until engagement stops meaning profit, the algorithm will keep radicalizing young people in both directions.
Published March 1, 2026 · Frisian News · Ljouwert, Fryslân