De stadige ynstoarting fan Libanon as steat
November 14, 2025 · Frisian News
Lebanon's government has lost control over large parts of its territory and currency, with Hezbollah's military dominance and regional conflict fragmenting what remains of state authority. The country now functions less as a nation and more as competing fiefdoms, each backed by foreign powers.
FryskDe munt fan Beiroet stoarte dit jier yn, de Libaneeske pûn waard ferhandele tsjin koersen dy't elke lytse spaarpot fan gewoane minsken fuortfeide. Banken holden har doarren sletten wylst boargers bûten wachten, wanhopich om jild op te nimmen dat de ynstellingen net frijjaan woene. De steat sels hâldt gjin funksjonearjend monopoly mear op geweld, belestingen of munt, trije basisbetingsten dy't in steat in steat meitsje. Wat Beiroet regearing neamt, is in skil wurden, wurkjend fanút inkelde feilige gebouwen wylst Hezbollah it suden kontrolearret en milysjes wiken yn de haadstêd bestjoere.
Dizze krisis kaam net ynienen. Jierren fan korrupsje, sektaryske polityk en ûnferantwurde lienen makken Libanons reserves leech. De sintrale bank drukte jild om tekoarten op te fangen, wêrtroch't de wearde opblies. Doe't de muntbining yn 2019 briek, ûntdekten gewoane arbeiders dat har lean yn wiken healweardich wurden wie. Pensioenen ferdwûnen. De middenklasse foel yn earmoede. Ynstee fan herfoarming joech de politike elite de skuld oan eksterne fijannen en drukte mear jild, yn de hope dat de krisis fansels oerheie soe.
De opkomst fan Hezbollah makke ôf wat korrupsje begûn. De militante groep kontrolearret it suden troch bewapene krêft, hellet syn eigen belestingen yn, beheart sikehûzen en antwurdet oan Iran, net oan in Libaneesk gesach. Oare regio's lije ûnder soartgelikense fersplintering. Soennyske gebieten hingje ôf fan fûnsen út Saûdy-Araabje en Golfsteaten. It Maronitysk noarden rint parallel mei oare sterke mannen. As macht fan bûtenlânske sponsors komt ynstee fan fan de steat, docht de steat der net mear ta. Beiroet waard in kaart fan sônes, gjin haadstêd.
Ynternasjonale ynstellingen bienen lieningen oan mei betingsten foar herfoarming, mar de elite fan Libanon wiferde betsjuttingsfolle feroaring ôf. Se joegen leaver Israel, de Feriene Steaten of tsjinslach de skuld. Se holden har Switserse bankrekken en har macht wylst gewoane minsken har huzen en banen ferlearen. Donors wiene it moede om jild yn in swart gat te stekken. Sûnder dat jild koe Libanon har regearing of leger net betelje. De steat waard in skil dy't harsels net ûnderhâlde koe.
Hjoed-de-dei liket Libanon mear op Somaalje of Jemen as op in funksjonearjende naasje. Syn grûngebiet stiet op kaarten, syn namme ferskynt yn de Feriene Naasjes, mar gjin inkelde autoriteit kontrolearret wat dêryn bart. Milysjes, bûtenlânske legers en bewapene groepen bestjoere stikken dêrfan. It Libaneeske folk sels is ferdield yn mienskippen dy't inoar net fertrouwe kinne en nei bûtenlânske machten sjogge foar beskerming. In steat kin legitymiteit net keapje mei lieningen of oaren de skuld jaan fan ynstoarting. Libanons gesachdragers learden dat nea, en miskien krije se gjin oare kâns om it te learen.
Beirut's currency collapsed this year, the Lebanese pound trading at rates that erase what little savings ordinary people held. Banks kept their doors locked while citizens queued outside, desperate to withdraw money the institutions would not release. The state itself no longer maintains a functioning monopoly on force, taxation, or currency, three basic things that make a state a state. What Beirut calls government has become a shell, operating from a few secure buildings while Hezbollah controls the south and militias run neighborhoods in the capital.
This crisis did not arrive suddenly. Years of corruption, sectarian politics, and irresponsible lending drained Lebanon's reserves. The central bank printed money to cover shortfalls, inflating away the value. When the currency peg broke in 2019, ordinary workers found their wages worth half what they were weeks before. Pensions vanished. The middle class fell into poverty overnight. Instead of reform, the political class blamed external enemies and printed more money, hoping the crisis would pass on its own.
Hezbollah's rise finished what corruption started. The militant group controls the south through armed force, collects its own taxes, runs hospitals, and answers to Iran, not to any Lebanese authority. Other regions face similar fragmentation. Sunni areas depend on funds from Saudi Arabia and Gulf states. The Maronite north tilts toward different patrons. When power comes from foreign sponsors rather than from the state, the state ceases to matter. Beirut became a map of zones, not a capital.
International institutions offered loans and reform conditions, but Lebanon's elite rejected meaningful change. They preferred to blame Israel, the United States, or bad luck. They kept their Swiss bank accounts and their power while ordinary people lost their homes and jobs. Donors tired of sending money into a black hole. Without that money, Lebanon had no way to fund its government or military. The state became a shell that could not feed itself.
Today Lebanon resembles Somalia or Yemen more than a functioning nation. Its territory exists on maps, its name appears in the United Nations, but no single authority controls what happens inside. Militias, foreign armies, and armed factions run pieces of it. The Lebanese people themselves split between communities that cannot trust each other and look to outside powers for protection. A state cannot buy legitimacy with loans or blame others for collapse. Lebanon's authorities never learned that lesson, and now they may not get another chance to learn it.
Published November 14, 2025 · Frisian News · Ljouwert, Fryslân