The Slow Collapse of Lebanon as a State
November 14, 2025 · Frisian News
Lebanon's government has lost control over large parts of its territory and currency, with Hezbollah's military dominance and regional conflict fragmenting what remains of state authority. The country now functions less as a nation and more as competing fiefdoms, each backed by foreign powers.
Beirut's currency collapsed this year, the Lebanese pound trading at rates that erase what little savings ordinary people held. Banks kept their doors locked while citizens queued outside, desperate to withdraw money the institutions would not release. The state itself no longer maintains a functioning monopoly on force, taxation, or currency, three basic things that make a state a state. What Beirut calls government has become a shell, operating from a few secure buildings while Hezbollah controls the south and militias run neighborhoods in the capital.
This crisis did not arrive suddenly. Years of corruption, sectarian politics, and irresponsible lending drained Lebanon's reserves. The central bank printed money to cover shortfalls, inflating away the value. When the currency peg broke in 2019, ordinary workers found their wages worth half what they were weeks before. Pensions vanished. The middle class fell into poverty overnight. Instead of reform, the political class blamed external enemies and printed more money, hoping the crisis would pass on its own.
Hezbollah's rise finished what corruption started. The militant group controls the south through armed force, collects its own taxes, runs hospitals, and answers to Iran, not to any Lebanese authority. Other regions face similar fragmentation. Sunni areas depend on funds from Saudi Arabia and Gulf states. The Maronite north tilts toward different patrons. When power comes from foreign sponsors rather than from the state, the state ceases to matter. Beirut became a map of zones, not a capital.
International institutions offered loans and reform conditions, but Lebanon's elite rejected meaningful change. They preferred to blame Israel, the United States, or bad luck. They kept their Swiss bank accounts and their power while ordinary people lost their homes and jobs. Donors tired of sending money into a black hole. Without that money, Lebanon had no way to fund its government or military. The state became a shell that could not feed itself.
Today Lebanon resembles Somalia or Yemen more than a functioning nation. Its territory exists on maps, its name appears in the United Nations, but no single authority controls what happens inside. Militias, foreign armies, and armed factions run pieces of it. The Lebanese people themselves split between communities that cannot trust each other and look to outside powers for protection. A state cannot buy legitimacy with loans or blame others for collapse. Lebanon's authorities never learned that lesson, and now they may not get another chance to learn it.
De munt fan Beirut stûn yn yn dit jier, de Libaneeske pûn waard hannele op koersen dy't elke lyts spierbuks fan gewoane minsken weifage. Banken hielden har doarren ticht, wylst boargers bûten wachtsje, wanhopich om jild op te trekken dat de ynstellings net freegave woene. De steat sels handhavet gjin funksjonearre monopoly op geweld, belestingen of munt mear, trije basisfoarwurden dy't in steat in steat meitsje. Wat Beirut reg namt, is in skâl wurden, wurkjend út some feilige gebouwen wylst Hezbollah it suden kontrolearret en milisia's wyken yn de haadstêd besjarrje.
Deze krisis kaam net plein. Jieren fan korrúpsje, sektalike polityk en ûnfertwurdich lienen drûgden Libanon syn reserves. De sintrale bank drukte jild om tekoarten op te vangen, werbij de wearde opblies. Doe't de mûnthâlding yn 2019 brak, ûntdekten gewoane arbeiders dat har loanskjen heal wearde waarden yn wiken. Pensjoenen ferdwûnen. De middenklasse fie yn earmoed. Yn stee fan ferbettering gaf de politike elite de skuld oan eksterne fjanden en drukte mear jild, hopjend dat de krisis fan sels ferbij gean soe.
Hezbollah's opkomst makke ôf wat korrúpsje begûn. De militante groep kontrolearret it suden troch bewapende krêft,int syn eigen belestingen, runt sikehûzen en antwortet oan Iran, net oan in Libaneeske oerheid. Oare regio's lide ûnder lykelswat fersnippering. Soennitarreinen hingje ôf fan fûnsen út Saudi-Araabië en Golflânnen. It Maronitiske noarden lit parallel mei oare sterke manlju. Doe't macht fan bûtenlandske sponsors komt ynstee fan fan de steat, stoppet de steat it oer diel te dwaan. Beirut waard in kaart fan sônen, gjin haadstêd.
Internationale ynstellings boaden lienen en ferbetterings foarwurden, mar Libanon syn elite wie ongerstallich foar betsjutende feroaring. Se hienen lever Israel, de Feriene Steaten of slechte gelok de skuld jaan. Se hielden har Switserse bankrekeningen en har macht wylst gewoane minsken har huzen en banen ferlearen. Donateurs waarden sûch it jild yn in swart gat te stopjen. Sûnder dat jild koe Libanon har regering of leger net betelle. De steat waard in skâl dy't harsels net ûnderhâlde koe.
Ljouwers de dei liket Libanon mear op Somaliё of Jemen dan op in funksjonearre nasje. Syn lângrûnten stiet op kaarten, syn namme ferskynt yn de Feriene Steaten, mar gjin ienige oerheid kontrolearret wat dêryn bart. Milisia's, bûtenlandske legers en bewapende groepen besjarrje stoken derfan. It Libaneeske folk sels dield yn gemeenskippen dy't inoar net betrouwe kinne en nei bûtenlandske foegen sykje foar beskerming. In steat kin legitimitaat net keapje mei lienen of oaren de skuld jaan fan ynstorting. Libanon syn oerauden learden dat noait, en spannij't se gjin oar momint te learen krije.
Published November 14, 2025 · Frisian News · Ljouwert, Fryslân