Wêrom de middenklasse oeral yn it Westen krimt
May 21, 2025 · Frisian News
Wage stagnation, rising housing costs, and financialization have hollowed out the middle class across Europe and North America. The shift leaves fewer workers in secure jobs and pushes millions toward precarity or dependence on state support.
FryskIn fabrieksarbeider yn Stuttgart fertsjinnet yn reële termen minder as syn heit yn 1985. In ferpleechster yn Amsterdam kin har gjin hûs feroarderje yn de stêd dêr't sy wurket. In middenmanager yn Toronto sjocht har pensjoen krimpen wylst har hypoteek groeit. Dit binne gjin seldsume gefallen. It binne de regel oeral yn it rike Westen, en de sifers befêstigje wat wurknimmers al witte: de middenklasse ferdwynt.
Sûnt 1980 sakke it oandiel húshâldings mei middenynkommen yn de Feriene Steaten fan 61 prosint nei 50 prosint. Europa lit itselde patroan sjen. Reële lean foar oplaat wurknimmers binne tsientallen jierren stagnearre wylst wenjen, ûnderwiis en sikehûssoarch omheech rûnen. Aktivapriizen rûnen fier boppe leanferheging, wat jongere wurknimmers fan hûzebesit ôfsleat. Tagelyk krompen pensjoenfonsen, naam de wurksekerheid ôf, en foltiids stabiel wurk waard seldsem. De masine fan de moderne ekonomy sorteart minsken yn winners en ferliezers, en it midden biedt hieltyd minder skûlplak.
De-yndústrialisaasje spile in rol, mar finansialisearring die de echte skea. Doe't banken, fersekeringmaatskippijen en ynvestearringshuzen rykdom omheech slûsden en spekulaasje boppe produksje beleannen, nomme se de middenklasse it stabiele ynkommen ôf dêr't se ea fan libben. Globalisearring stjoerde fabryksbanen nei leechleanlannen wylst oplaat wurknimmers yn it Westen fûnen dat har feardichheden op in wrâldarbeidsmerk minder wurdich wiene. Belestingferleegings foar riken en bedriuwen betsjutten minder iepenbiere útjeften oan skoallen, diken en tsjinsten dy't ea it midden stipen. De steat luts him werom, en wurknimmers droegen de lêsten.
Regeringen en sintrale banken reagearren op elke krisis fanôf 2008 troch merken mei goedkeap jild te oerstreamjen. Dit joech aktivapriizen omheech en holp de riken har rykdom fêst te hâlden en groeie te litten. Wurknimmers sûnder aktiva fielden hjir neat fan. Ynstee dêrfan troffen se ynflaasje yn hier en iten, krappere arbeidsmerken, en de trochgeande bedriging fan ferdriuwing troch technology of bûtenlânske konkurrinsje. It fangnet waard skaarsder wylst de banen dy't ea in gesin foeden en fermogen bouen ferdwûnen.
Gjin politike partij yn it Westen hat in serieus antwurd jûn. Loftse partijen ferdigenje de status quo wolfearstelsels dy't boargers as ôfhinklikken behannele yn stee fan wurknimmers. Rjochtse partijen fiere deregulering en lege belestingen sûnder har ôf te freegjen wêrom gewoane minsken gjin fermogen opbouwe of har banen behâlde kinne. Beide negearje dat in funksjonearjende middenklasse banen fereasket dy't genôch betelje om mei wurdichheid te libjen, stabiel wurk dat feardichheden beleannet, en húsfêsting dy't wurknimmers echt betelje kinne. Sûnder dat stoart stabiliteit yn en groeit wrok.
A factory worker in Stuttgart earns less in real terms than his father did in 1985. A nurse in Amsterdam cannot afford a home in the city where she works. A middle manager in Toronto sees her pension shrink while her mortgage grows. These are not rare cases. They are the rule across the wealthy West, and the numbers confirm what workers already know: the middle class is disappearing.
Since 1980, the share of middle-income households in the United States fell from 61 percent to 50 percent. Europe shows the same pattern. Real wages for skilled workers have stagnated for decades while housing, education, and health care costs soared. Asset prices inflated far beyond wage growth, locking out younger workers from home ownership. At the same time, pension funds shrank, job security eroded, and full-time stable work became scarce. The machinery of the modern economy sorts people into winners and losers, and the middle offers less and less refuge.
De-industrialization played a role, but financialization did the real damage. When banks, insurance firms, and investment houses siphoned wealth upward and rewarded speculation over production, they starved the middle class of the stable income it once earned. Globalization sent manufacturing jobs to low-wage countries while educated workers in the West found their skills less valuable on a global labor market. Tax cuts for the rich and corporations meant less public spending on schools, roads, and services that once sustained the middle. The state withdrew, and workers bore the cost.
Governments and central banks responded to each crisis, from 2008 onward, by flooding markets with cheap money. This inflated asset prices and helped the wealthy hold and grow their wealth. Workers without assets felt none of this benefit. Instead, they faced inflation in rents and food, tighter job markets, and the constant threat of displacement by technology or outsourcing. The safety net grew more stingy while the jobs that once fed a family and built equity vanished.
No political party in the West has offered a serious answer. Left parties defend status quo welfare systems that treat citizens as dependents rather than workers. Right parties celebrate deregulation and low taxes without asking why ordinary people cannot build wealth or keep their jobs. Both ignore that a functioning middle class depends on jobs that pay enough to live with dignity, stable work that rewards skill, and housing that workers can actually afford. Without that, stability crumbles and resentment grows.
Published May 21, 2025 · Frisian News · Ljouwert, Fryslân