Wêrom Fersekerders harren Weromtrekke út Oerstreamingsgebieten
July 7, 2025 · Frisian News
Major insurers have stopped writing new flood policies in high-risk zones across Europe and North America, leaving homeowners uninsured and governments scrambling for solutions.
FryskFerline moanne kundige State Farm oan gjin oerstreamingsfersekeringen mear yn Louisiana te fernijen, wêrmei 13.000 polissen yn ien steat stopset waarden. Oan de oare kant fan de Atlantyske Oseaan lûken Jeropeeske fersekerders harren werom út kustgebieten yn Nederlân, Dútslân en Skandinavje. It berjocht fanút de haadkwartieren fan bedriuwen is dúdlik: de rekkenkeunst kloppet net mear. De stoarmfrekwinsje is yn twa desennia mei 40 prosint oprûn, skeaclaims binne eksplozjef groeid, en premys kinne net fluch genôch omheech om it risiko by te hâlden.
Fersekerders besteane om risiko's oer in protte klanten te spriede. As te folle klanten yn deselde gefaarzone wenje, beswykket it systeem. In inkele grutte oerstreaming kin jierren oan premyynkomsten útwiskje. Fersekerders reagearje troch prizen te ferheegjen, en as klanten net betelje wolle, fertrekke de bedriuwen gewoan. Se hawwe gjin ferplichting om immen earne te fersekeren. De merk wurket troch ferlit.
Regearingen steane no foar in lelike kar. Guon hawwe steatsfersekeringspools oprjochte foar ôfwiisde klanten, lykas Frankryk en Belgje dien hawwe. Dizze pools rekkenje legere premys as de merk dwaan soe, wat betsjut dat sûne balansen fluch lytser wurde. Oare regio's lizze ferplichte fersekering op fia wet, en twinge bedriuwen te bliuwen. Nederlân besocht dit en sjocht syn fersekerders dochs harren aktiviteiten ferlytsje. Gjin fan dizze oplossingen lost it kernprobleem op: mear minsken wenje op gefaarlike plakken as de ekonomyske werklikheid drage kin.
De echte skuldige sit yn romtlike oardering en boubelied, net yn fersekeringsrekkenkeunst. Gemeenten bouden huzen en bedriuwen yn oerstreamingsgebieten yn desennia lang omdat lân goedkeap wie en de boucodes loskes wienen. Fersekerders subsidiearren dizze útwreiding troch goedkeape dekking oan te bieden. No't it risiko him omset hat yn sichtbere ferliezen, einiget de subsydzje. Stêden dy't bou yn wetlands of rivierdeltas tastienen, sjogge harren fêstgoedwearden ynstorten en harren belestingbases ynkrimpe.
De weromtrekking fan fersekerders sil klimaatpatroanen net omkeare of ûntwikkelingsflaters ûngedien meitsje. It sil yn plak dêrfan in skerpe korreksje ôftwinge wêrby't eigendommen yn echte oerstreamingssones wearde ferlieze en allinne foar dyjingen betelber wurde dy't it risiko akseptearje. Dit klinkt hurd, mar it slacht better oan as it alternatyf: einleaze oerheidsstipe foar ferkearde karren. Merken wurkje it bêste as sy de wierheid fertelle oer kosten.
Last month, State Farm announced it would no longer renew flood insurance in Louisiana, dropping 13,000 policies in one state alone. Across the Atlantic, European insurers pulled back from coastal regions in the Netherlands, Germany, and Scandinavia. The message from corporate headquarters is blunt: the math no longer works. Storm frequency has jumped 40 percent in two decades, claims have ballooned, and premiums cannot rise fast enough to match the risk.
Insurance companies exist to spread risk across many customers. When too many customers live in the same danger zone, the system breaks. A single major flood event can wipe out years of premium income. Insurers respond by raising prices, and when customers refuse to pay, the companies simply leave. They have no obligation to insure anyone in any location. The market works by abandonment.
Governments now face an ugly choice. Some have created state-run insurance pools to cover the rejected customers, as France and Belgium have done. These pools charge lower premiums than the market would, which means healthy balance sheets sink fast. Other regions impose mandatory insurance through law, forcing companies to stay. The Netherlands tried this and watches its insurers shrink their operations anyway. None of these fixes addresses the core problem: more people live in dangerous places than economic reality can support.
The real culprit sits in zoning and development policy, not in insurance math. Communities built homes and businesses in flood zones for decades because land was cheap and building codes were loose. Insurance companies subsidized this sprawl by offering cheap coverage. Now that the risk has matured into visible losses, the subsidy ends. Towns and cities that allowed construction in wetlands or river deltas now watch their property values crater and their tax bases shrivel.
The withdrawal of insurers will not reverse climate patterns or undo development mistakes. It will instead force a sharp correction in which properties in genuine flood zones lose value and become affordable only to those who accept the risk. This sounds harsh, but it beats the alternative: endless government subsidy of bad choices. Markets work best when they tell the truth about cost.
Published July 7, 2025 · Frisian News · Ljouwert, Fryslân