De skiednis fan hongersneed en de regearingen dy't se feroarsaken
June 18, 2026 · Frisian News
Famines throughout history have been caused by government policies and decisions, not by nature. From Bengal to Ukraine to China, states used control over food as a tool of power, killing millions.
FryskYn 1943 waard Bengalen troffen troch hongersneed dy't likernôch trije miljoen minsken deade. It nôt wie der: Yndia eksportearre dat jier mear rys en tarwe as it jier dêrfoar. De Britske regearing, dy't Yndia doe kontrolearre, joech prioriteit oan militêre foarsjenningen en stjoerde nôt nei oare dielen fan har ryk. Lokale amtners en boargerleiders fregen om help. It kabinet fan Churchill wegere fersiken om fiedselhulp. Doe't it oantal deaden katastrofaal waard, joech de Britske regearing it de skuld fan rispingstekoarten en minne omstannichheden, net fan har eigen karren.
Dit wie gjin útsûndering. De Ierske hongersneed fan 1845-1852 deade in miljoen minsken yn in lân mei in ieuwen âlde lânbowtradysje. Ierlân produsearre genôch iten om harsels te fiede. De eksport gie troch tidens de krisis. It Britske belied joech prioriteit oan frije hannel en eigendomsrjochten fan lânhearen boppe oerlibjen. Nôtskippen ferlieten Ierske havens wylst minsken stoaren. In regearing koe yngripe. Se keas dêr net foar. Yn Oekraïne konfiskearre de regearing fan Stalin nôt yn 1932-1933, wylst se wist dat de rispinge mislearre wie. It gefolch wie de Holodomor: in opsetlike ferhongering dy't tusken fiif en tsien miljoen minsken deade. It nôt wie der. De steat naam it dochs.
Moderne regearingen beweare dat sintraliseare kontrôle hongersneed foarkomt. It argumint is oanlokklik: bettere gegevens, bettere logistyk, bettere planning foarkomme de katastrofes fan de skiednis. Mar de Grutte Sprong Foarút yn Sina fan 1959-1961 deade neffens skatting 30 miljoen minsken yn in tiidrek fan tweintichste-ieuske technology en in steat dy't totale autoriteit oer iten en arbeid opeaske. De regearing fan Mao stelde kwota yn dy't ûnmooglik wiene. It konfiskearre nôt dat as siedguod of needfoarried reservearre wêze moatten hie. Amtners logen oer rispingen, om't in mislearre rispinge ûntslach of dea betsjutte. It systeem hie gjin korreksjemeganisme, gjin manier om de koers te kearen as de kosten sichtber waarden. Macht sûnder ferantwurdlikheid en sûnder it fermogen om nee te sizzen skept de betingsten foar massale ferhongering.
Hongersneed is net ferdwûn. Yn Fenezuëla dreau oerheidskontrôle oer produksje en priis de munt nei weardeleazheid en bedriuwen nei ynstorting. Yn Somalje en fragile steaten kinne swakke regearingen en kriichshearen befoarriedigingslinys net beskermje. Mar sjoch wat hongersneed yn it grutste part fan de wrâld foarkomt: net regearingsplanning, mar merken en desentralisearre netwurken dy't op priissinjalen reagearje. In boer sjocht dat mais djoer is en ferbout mear. In hanneler sjocht skaarsens en bringt foarrieden fan elders oan. Sadree't in regearing oannimmet dat se dit better dwaan kin as miljoenen yndividuen dy't har eigen karren meitsje, sadree't se harsels net mear ôffraget oft har beslissingen minsken ferhongerje litte kinne, rint it risiko op.
Hongersneed binne gjin natoerrampen. It binne regearingsflaters. De minsken dy't de karren meitsje binne net altyd min. Se binne faak oertsjûge dat se libbens rêde of in grutter goed tsjinje. De skiednis leart ús dat oertsjûging sûnder beskeidenheid, en macht sûnder weromkoppeling, miljoenen deamakket. De fraach dy't it wurdich is te stellen is net oft regearing hongersneed foarkomme kin. It is oft regearingsmacht, as dy ien kear oannommen is, beheind wurde kin.
In 1943, Bengal experienced a famine that killed roughly three million people. The grain was there: India exported more rice and wheat that year than in the previous one. The British government, which controlled India at the time, prioritized military supplies and sent grain to other parts of its empire. Local officials and civic leaders asked for help. Churchill's cabinet denied requests for food relief. When death tolls reached catastrophic levels, the British government blamed harvest shortfalls and bad luck, not their own choices.
This was not an anomaly. The Irish famine of 1845-1852 killed a million people in a country with centuries of farming tradition. Ireland produced enough food to feed itself. Exports continued throughout the crisis. British policy prioritized free trade and landlord property rights over survival. Grain ships left Irish ports while people starved. A government could have intervened. It chose not to. In Ukraine, Stalin's government confiscated grain in 1932-1933, knowing the harvest had failed. The result was the Holodomor: a deliberate starvation that killed between five and ten million. The grain existed. The state took it anyway.
Modern governments claim centralized control prevents famines. The argument is seductive: better data, better logistics, better planning prevent the catastrophes of history. But the Great Leap Forward in China from 1959-1961 killed an estimated 30 million people in an era of twentieth-century technology and a state claiming total authority over food and labor. Mao's government imposed quotas it knew were impossible. It confiscated grain meant to be seed or emergency reserve. Officials lied about harvests because failure meant demotion or death. The system had no correction mechanism, no way to reverse course when the cost became visible. Power without accountability and without the ability to say no creates the conditions for mass starvation.
Famines have not disappeared. In Venezuela, government controls over production and price drove currency into worthlessness and farms into collapse. In Somalia and fragile states, weak governments and warlords cannot protect supply lines. But notice what prevents famines in most of the world: not government planning, but markets and decentralized networks that respond to price signals. A farmer sees corn is expensive and grows more. A trader sees scarcity and brings supplies from elsewhere. The moment a government assumes it can do this better than millions of individuals making their own choices, the moment it stops asking whether its decisions might starve people, risk rises.
Famines are not natural disasters. They are failures of governance. The people making the choices are not always malicious. They are often convinced they save lives or serve a greater good. History shows us that conviction without humility, and power without feedback, kills millions. The question worth asking is not whether government can prevent famine. It is whether governmental power, once assumed, can be bounded.
Published June 18, 2026 · Frisian News · Ljouwert, Fryslân