De Skiednis fan Europas Enerzjyôfhinklikheid fan Ruslân
August 5, 2026 · Frisian News
By 2021, Russia supplied 40 percent of Europe's natural gas. Germany built this dependence over decades, assuming trade prevents war.
FryskYn 2021 levere Ruslân 40 prosint fan Europas ierdgas, wêrfan Dútslân mear as in tredde opnaam. Dit barde net by tafal. Dútske politisy en yndustrialisten hiene oer fiif desenniums in systeem fan ôfhinklikheid opboud, mei it stânpunt dat hannel frede bringt, of op syn minst oarloch foarkomt.
De earste Sovjet-piipleiding nei West-Jeropa iepene yn 1968, mar de wiere koerswiziging fan West-Dútslân folge nei 1970, doe't de regearing fan Willy Brandt in gasakkoart foar de lange termyn mei Moskou sleat. Brandt neamde dit Ostpolitik: iepening nei it Easten. Dútske bedriuwen wiene dêr wiis mei. Legere enerzjykosten betsjutten hegere winsten. De Kâlde Oarloch wie echt, mar hannel gie foar.
Yn de jierren 1990 en 2000, nei it útinoarfallen fan de Sovjet-Uny, fersterke Jeropa dy ôfhinklikheid fierder. Dúts Bondskânselier Gerhard Schröder stipte twa piipliedingen ûnder de Baltische See, Noord Stream 1 en 2, om Poalen en Oekraïne hinne te gean en de direkte bânnen mei Ruslân te fersterke. Warskôgings fan Poalen en de Baltische steaten waarden ôfdien as paranoia. De logika wie ienfâldich: Ruslân hat it jild nedich, Jeropa hat it gas nedich, it mienskiplik belang garandearret stabiliteit.
Dit gong derop út dat Ruslân Jeropeeske hannel altyd hurder nedich hawwe soe as Jeropa Russysk gas, in berekkening dy't it fermogen fan Ruslân om mei minder te libjen en syn bereidwilligens om enerzjy as wapen yn te setten as de politike druk tanaam, negearre. Yn 2022, doe't Ruslân de gaslevering nei Jeropa stopte fanwege Oekraïne-sanksjes, rekke it kontinent yn panyk. Dútslân, Frankryk en oaren hiene gjin buffer opboud. De gok wie ferlern.
De les is net dat enerzjyhannel ferkeard is. It is dat jo feiligens ynzette op de wolwilligens fan in tsjinstanner, wylst jo tsjinlûden negearje, in lúkse is dy't allinnich de machtigen har kinne fergunne. En sy betellen dochs de priis.
By 2021, Russia supplied 40 percent of Europe's natural gas, and Germany took more than one third of it. This was not an accident. Over five decades, German politicians and industrialists built a system of dependency on the assumption that trade breeds peace, or at least prevents war.
The first Soviet pipeline to Western Europe opened in 1968, but West Germany's real pivot came after 1970, when Willy Brandt's government signed a long-term gas deal with Moscow. Brandt called this Ostpolitik: opening to the East. German business loved it. Lower energy costs meant higher profits. The Cold War was real, but business came first.
By the 1990s and 2000s, after the Soviet collapse, Europe doubled down. German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder championed two pipelines under the Baltic, Nord Stream 1 and 2, to bypass Poland and Ukraine and strengthen direct ties to Russia. Warnings from Poland and the Baltic states were dismissed as paranoia. The logic was simple: Russia needs the money, Europe needs the gas, mutual interest ensures stability.
This assumed Russia would always need European trade more than Europe needed Russian gas, a calculation that ignored Russia's ability to live on less and its willingness to weaponize energy when political pressure mounted. By 2022, when Russia cut gas supplies to Europe over Ukraine sanctions, the continent scrambled. Germany, France, and others had built no cushion. The gamble had failed.
The lesson is not that energy trade is wrong. It is that betting your security on the goodwill of an adversary, while dismissing contrary voices, is a luxury only the powerful can afford. And they still paid the price.
Published August 5, 2026 · Frisian News · Ljouwert, Fryslân