De skiednis fan Europeeske enerzjyôfhinklikheid fan Ruslân
June 24, 2025 · Frisian News
Europe built its economy on cheap Russian gas and oil for decades, creating a dependency that politicians ignored until conflict forced a reckoning. Today, the continent scrambles to break free from the arrangement that made economic sense but cost it political leverage.
FryskYn 1968 foltôge de Sovjet-Uny de earste grutte pypleiding dy't gas nei it westen brocht, oant Praach en fierder. West-Jeropa hiet de goedkeape brânstof wolkom sûnder drege fragen te stellen oer de betingsten dy't dêran ferbûn wienen. Yn de jierren tachtich keapte West-Dútslân in tredde fan syn gas by Moskou, en oare lannen folgen. De logika like solide: Ruslân hie boarnen, Jeropa hie jild en yndustry, en beide kanten profitearren. Nimmen spruts oer wat barre soe as de kraan ticht draaid wurde soe.
De eigentlike grip fersterke nei it ein fan de Kâlde Oarloch. Ruslân, wanhopich om hurde faluta, ferkocht enerzjy tsjin dumpprizen. Ek East-Europeeske steaten fieden de pypleiding, wêrtroch Moskou de enerzjypomp fan it kontinint waard. Bedriuwen en regearingen gienen derfan út dat dit altyd goedkeap bliuwe soe. Gazprom, Ruslâns steatsmonopolje foar gas, waard de spil fan it Europeeske enerzjybelied sûnder dat immen it doarste ta te jaan. Goedkeap gas betsjutte goedkeapere elektrisiteit, goedkeapere ferwaarming, goedkeap alles. Kiezers wiene bliid mei legere rekkens. Politisy stelden gjin fragen.
As Oekraïne him tsjin Russyske druk fersette, draaide Moskou yn de winter it gas ticht. Jeropa helle de skouders op en fûn útwegen. Doe't Ruslân Georgje yn 2008 ynfoel, neamde Jeropa it betreurenswurdich mar bleau keapjen. It patroan werhelle him, en Jeropa bleau de oare kant út sjen. Dútske politisy foaral hâlden fol dat hannelsbinen Ruslân fredelik meitsje soene en dat sanksjes mear skea oan Jeropa as oan Ruslân dwaan soene. Hja hienen ûngelyk op beide punten, mar tsjin dy tiid wie de ôfhinklikheid te djip woartele om sûnder pine te brekken.
De ynvaazje fan Oekraïne yn 2022 brak de ylluuzje dat it keapjen fan Russyske enerzjy frede bewarje soe. Jeropa stie ynienen foar in ûnmooglike kar: befrieze of him fan Moskou ôfsnide. Lannen grepen nei floeiber gas út Amearika en oars, tsjin de trijedûbbele fan de priis. Dútslân, dat syn kearnsintrale sletten hie en op Russysk gas foar stabiliteit fertroude, stie foar in enerzjykrisis dy't it sels troch desennia fan wishful thinking skepen hie. De rekkens kamen allegear tagelyk.
Hjoed haast Jeropa him om Russyske enerzjy te ferfangen troch alternativen dy't djoerder binne en stadiger oankomme. LNG-terminals fersprieden har oer it kontinint. Sinne- en wynparken groeie, mar folje it gat net folslein. De les komt te let: steaten meie nea ideology en jild har oardiel oer fitale boarnen beynfloedzje litte. Jeropa betelle foar syn ôfhinklikheid mei hegere rekkens, swakkere yndustry en ferlerne ynfloed. Guon partnerskippen koste blykber gewoan te folle.
In 1968, the Soviet Union completed the first major pipeline bringing gas west to Prague and beyond. Western Europe welcomed the cheap fuel without asking hard questions about the strings attached. By the 1980s, West Germany bought a third of its gas from Moscow, while other nations followed suit. The logic seemed sound: Russia had resources, Europe had money and industry, and both sides gained. No one talked about what happened if the taps shut off.
The real bind tightened after the Cold War ended. Russia, desperate for hard currency, sold energy at rock-bottom prices. Eastern European states also fed the pipeline, turning Moscow into the continent's fuel pump. Companies and governments counted on this to stay cheap forever. Gazprom, Russia's state gas monopoly, became the linchpin of European energy policy without anyone admitting it. Cheap gas meant cheaper electricity, cheaper heating, cheaper everything. Voters liked lower bills. Politicians asked no questions.
When Ukraine resisted Russian pressure, Moscow turned off the gas in winter. Europe shrugged and found workarounds. When Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, Europe called it regrettable but kept buying. The pattern repeated, and Europe kept looking away. German politicians, especially, insisted that trade bonds would make Russia peaceful and that sanctions would harm Europe more than Russia. They were wrong on both counts, but by then the pipeline addiction ran too deep to break without pain.
The Ukraine invasion in 2022 shattered the illusion that buying Russian energy would keep the peace. Europe suddenly faced an impossible choice: freeze or cut itself off from Moscow. Nations scrambled for liquefied gas from America and others, at triple the price. Germany, which had shut down its nuclear plants and relied on Russian gas for stability, faced an energy crisis it created through decades of wishful thinking. The bill came due all at once.
Today Europe races to replace Russian energy with alternatives that cost more and arrive slower. LNG terminals spread across the continent. Solar and wind farms grow, but fill the gap they cannot. The lesson arrives too late: states should never let ideology and money cloud their judgment on vital resources. Europe paid for its dependency with higher bills, weaker industry, and lost influence. Some partnerships, it seems, simply cost too much.
Published June 24, 2025 · Frisian News · Ljouwert, Fryslân