De skiednis fan Europeeske enerzjyôfhinklikheid fan Ruslân
July 29, 2026 · Frisian News
By 2021, Europe imported about 40 percent of its natural gas from Russia. That dependency grew across three decades as pipelines multiplied and contracts locked in, enriching energy companies while funding Putin's state budget.
FryskEuropa ymportearre om 2021 hinne sawat 40 prosint fan syn ierdgas út Ruslân. Dy ôfhinklikheid groeide gedurende 30 jier wylst pipeliedingen him útwreidden en kontrakten fêstlein waarden. Dútslân gie foaroan. It sleat grutte gasdealingen mei Moskou en seach syn eardere kânselier Gerhard Schröder dêrnei in sit ynnimme by Gazprom. Frânske, Italjaanske en Benelux-politisy dienen itselde.
De ekonomy like earst ienfâldich. Goedkeap Russysk gas betsjutte goedkeapere elektrisiteit en legere produksjekosten. Kiezers hienen graach lege rekkens. Bedriuwen profitearren flink. Brussel neamde it 'ekonomyske yntegraasje' en 'ûnderlinge ôfhinklikheid.' Mar it wie ienrjochtingsferkear: Europa waard ôfhinklik fan Ruslân, net oarsom.
Enerzjybedriuwen fertsjinnen miljarden. Westerske banken finansierden de pipeliedingen. Mar gewoane Europeanen beteallen de ferburgen priis. Hja finansierden Putins steatsbegrutting streekrjocht. Gasopbringsten wurden Ruslâns wichtichste eksportboarne en wichtichste middel foar politike ôfpersing. Tsjin 2021, doe't spanningen om Oekraïne hinne oprûnen, hie Europa him al fêstlein.
It geopolitike risiko wie nea ferburgen. Ruslân foel Georgje oan yn 2008. It ferovere de Krim yn 2014. It stopte it gas nei Oekraïne yn 'e winter, sadat boargers frieze soene as drukmiddel foar politike konsesjens. Dochs boude Europa mear pipeliedingen en sleat langere kontrakten. Politisy yn Brussel en Berlyn koasen komfort boppe foarsoarch.
2022 bewiisde wat skeptisy desennia earder seinen. In kontinent kocht goedkeap ierdgas en negeare syn eigen geopolityk. De rekkening kaam yn deade Oekraïners, enerzjyôfpersing en prizen dy't trijekear sa heech wurden. Europeeske lieders koasen komfort. Ruslân keas macht. It ferskil telde.
Europe imported about 40 percent of its natural gas from Russia by 2021. That dependency grew across 30 years as pipelines multiplied and contracts locked in. Germany led the way. It signed major gas deals with Moscow, then watched its former chancellor Gerhard Schröder take a board seat at Gazprom after leaving office. French, Italian, and Benelux politicians did the same.
The economics looked simple at first. Cheap Russian gas meant cheaper electricity and lower manufacturing costs. Voters liked low bills. Companies liked high margins. Brussels called it "economic integration" and "interdependence." But it was one-way: Europe became dependent on Russia, not the reverse.
Energy companies made billions. Western banks financed the pipelines. But ordinary Europeans paid the hidden cost. They funded Putin's state budget directly. Gas revenue became Russia's main export income and its main weapon for political coercion. By 2021, as tensions rose over Ukraine, Europe had already locked itself in.
The geopolitical risk was never hidden. Russia invaded Georgia in 2008. It seized Crimea in 2014. It cut gas to Ukraine in winter, freezing civilians to force political concessions. Yet Europe built more pipelines and signed longer contracts. Politicians in Brussels and Berlin chose comfort over caution.
2022 proved what skeptics said decades earlier. A continent bought cheap gas and ignored its own geopolitics. The bill came due in killed Ukrainians, energy blackmail, and prices that tripled. Europe's leaders chose comfort. Russia chose power. The difference mattered.
Published July 29, 2026 · Frisian News · Ljouwert, Fryslân